Security Analysis
Threat Model
Adversarial Capabilities:
Network Adversary: Can observe all network traffic, perform timing analysis
Malicious Storage Nodes: May attempt to censor, corrupt, or leak user data
Compromised Aggregators: May submit invalid proofs or collude to deanonymize users
Security Goals:
Confidentiality: Adversary learns nothing about plaintext data
Integrity: Data tampering is detectable
Availability: Censorship-resistant data retrieval
Anonymity: User actions are unlinkable
Cryptographic Security
Assumptions:
Hardness of Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) over elliptic curves
Security of AES-256 under chosen-plaintext attack
Soundness of zk-SNARK proving system
Formal Verification:
Core cryptographic primitives audited by Trail of Bits (Q1 2025)
Solana smart contracts formally verified using Certora Prover
Economic Security
Sybil Resistance:
Staking requirements create economic cost for Sybil attacks
Reputation system penalizes nodes with poor uptime
Collusion Resistance:
Proof aggregation is permissionless; users can choose aggregators
Slashing penalties disincentivize malicious behavior
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